Let's start with the beginning of Desert Storm and the events leading up to the declaration of war. We can look into how the past war and current efforts correlate to one another, as well as debate the validity of certain concerns and actions.
The main difference between the 1991 Gulf War and the Iraq War was the lack of a UN mandate in the latter authorising the use of force and Tony Blair tried to persuade President Bush to take the UN route before launching the invasion unilaterally but his desperate pleas fell on deaf ears. But the UN should not be the final arbiter of international security issues and sometimes nations have to go it alone for the sake of preserving their national interests without being approved by Russia and China.
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0307377229
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0307377229
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I don't see any UN authorization as being any kind of difference. The United States Congress authorized and funded both conflicts. But a great start to the thread.
Rocco....let's start with why Iraq was attacked by the US in 2003. It is often asked "why Iraq" when terrorists from Saudi Arabia trained in Afghanistan attacked us on 9-11. Why would we then invade Iraq in 2003?
Your floor.
Rocco....let's start with why Iraq was attacked by the US in 2003. It is often asked "why Iraq" when terrorists from Saudi Arabia trained in Afghanistan attacked us on 9-11. Why would we then invade Iraq in 2003?
Your floor.
Stonewall, et al,
Yeah, this is a step-by-step logic.
The US is (not theory) a political-military hegemony. We operate by the carrot and stick method; but we waive the stick very hard. At one time the military component had a saying:
Diplomacy was based on the presentation that any US suggestion was Option "A" --- and if you didn't do it our way, then you can go to option "B;" the military hard way.
There was a "Think Tank" called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) (with a number of very influential members) that stressed US leadership into the 21st Century through brute strength.
Some of the members included (1997/8time frame):
In January 1998, the PNAC wrote a letter to then President Clinton, and stated in part:
While POTUS did not act on this recommendation, the key to remember is that many of the PNAC members that signed or supported this recommendation were soon to come into positions of great power and influence.
Having said that, the PNAC was correct in part: "American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War."
This is the seed that blossomed.
(The FOCUS of the DAY)
The grand plan was simple. The logic was to plant a huge stick right in the middle of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Region; equal distant from every aggressor and able to put a crimp in any offensive action that might develop a threat against oil interests or Israel. And Iraq fit the strategic bill. All they had to do was figure out a way to justify a regime change, and install a US friendly government that would be grateful and allow a couple of military bases.
Then fate intervened. The US was traumatized by 911, and itching for a fight. And the threat could all be traced back to the Middle East (Game-On). Cook the books, demonize Saddam, launch a Madison Avenue style campaign, and win public and Congressional support. Saddam Hussein became the greatest threat America has ever faced since Adolf Hitler; and the President gets to become the most famous wartime President history ever recorded since Lincoln and Roosevelt.
America could create a shadow force over any of the Arab Nations threatening Israel, lifting the pressure off them and changing the paradigm that might lead to peace in Palestine. At the same time, Iran would now be now well within striking distance. The bases were sufficient to support not only conventional strike capabilities, but asymmetric operations (covert, clandestine or paramilitary) throughout the two regions and even into Yemen.
That is the "why" in thumbnail form.
Most Respectfully,
R
Yeah, this is a step-by-step logic.
(THE BACKDROP)
The US is (not theory) a political-military hegemony. We operate by the carrot and stick method; but we waive the stick very hard. At one time the military component had a saying:
Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.
Diplomacy was based on the presentation that any US suggestion was Option "A" --- and if you didn't do it our way, then you can go to option "B;" the military hard way.
There was a "Think Tank" called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) (with a number of very influential members) that stressed US leadership into the 21st Century through brute strength.
Some of the members included (1997/8time frame):
- Elliott Abrams, He served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser in the administration of President George W. Bush.
- Gary Bauer, held several jobs in the Ronald Reagan administration, rising to the directorship of the White House's Office of Policy Development.
- William J. Bennett, served as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under President George H. W. Bush.
- Jeb Bush, the brother.
- Dick Cheney, VP and former SECDEF
- Paula Dobriansky, the Undersecretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs
- Aaron Friedberg, Cheney's Deputy Assistant for National-Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning.
- Dan Quayle, former VP
- Zalmay Khalilzad, former Ambo to Afghanistan and Iraq
- I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, former CoS, Cheney
Plus: - Donald Rumsfeld SECDEF and Paul Wolfowitz Principle Deputy SECDEF
- R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence
- Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- Richard L. Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State
In January 1998, the PNAC wrote a letter to then President Clinton, and stated in part:
PNAC Ltr to POTUS January 26 said:
While POTUS did not act on this recommendation, the key to remember is that many of the PNAC members that signed or supported this recommendation were soon to come into positions of great power and influence.
Having said that, the PNAC was correct in part: "American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War."
This is the seed that blossomed.
(The FOCUS of the DAY)
The grand plan was simple. The logic was to plant a huge stick right in the middle of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Region; equal distant from every aggressor and able to put a crimp in any offensive action that might develop a threat against oil interests or Israel. And Iraq fit the strategic bill. All they had to do was figure out a way to justify a regime change, and install a US friendly government that would be grateful and allow a couple of military bases.
Then fate intervened. The US was traumatized by 911, and itching for a fight. And the threat could all be traced back to the Middle East (Game-On). Cook the books, demonize Saddam, launch a Madison Avenue style campaign, and win public and Congressional support. Saddam Hussein became the greatest threat America has ever faced since Adolf Hitler; and the President gets to become the most famous wartime President history ever recorded since Lincoln and Roosevelt.
America could create a shadow force over any of the Arab Nations threatening Israel, lifting the pressure off them and changing the paradigm that might lead to peace in Palestine. At the same time, Iran would now be now well within striking distance. The bases were sufficient to support not only conventional strike capabilities, but asymmetric operations (covert, clandestine or paramilitary) throughout the two regions and even into Yemen.
That is the "why" in thumbnail form.
Most Respectfully,
R
JLetterman, et al,
Desert Storm: 17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991(Ground) - 30 November 1995(AIR)
Somebody once told me that "WAR" is a result of diplomatic failures. As tumultuous the victory was in Gulf War I, at least part of the blame rest with the United States (my personal opinion). While it is true, that there was an oil dispute, and a $14B loan agreement, these were workable. But I think what made the invasion of Kuwait an option was the way in which Saddam Hussein interpreted the US position, as expressed by the on-scene Ambassador, April Glaspie, 25 July 1990. She essentially stated:
(OPINION)
It was my opinion then, and it is my opinion now, that our ally, Saddam Hussein, thought that (in political-ese) the US was giving Iraq a "green light" for military action. And we were, just not on the scale that Saddam Hussein was contemplating. As the Ambassador said: "I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait." Clearly implying that we did expect him to take some of Kuwait; just the oil dispute areas; the al-Rumaila Oil Field 15-20 miles from the Kuwaiti border, inside Iraq.
On 3 March 1991: Iraq accepts the terms of a ceasefire Safwan Accords, and the UN Security Council Resolution 686 2 March 1991; and then the following month, the UNSC Resolution 687. It is in UNSC Resolution 687 that the first mention on WMD restrictions are made. This sets the stage for the subsequent struggle over WMD issues in Iraq.
Most Respectfully,
R
...................................In Remembrance:
Desert Storm: 17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991(Ground) - 30 November 1995(AIR)
Somebody once told me that "WAR" is a result of diplomatic failures. As tumultuous the victory was in Gulf War I, at least part of the blame rest with the United States (my personal opinion). While it is true, that there was an oil dispute, and a $14B loan agreement, these were workable. But I think what made the invasion of Kuwait an option was the way in which Saddam Hussein interpreted the US position, as expressed by the on-scene Ambassador, April Glaspie, 25 July 1990. She essentially stated:
- "we have no opinion on Arab-Arab issues, such as your border disagreement with Kuwait."
It was eight days later that Iraq invaded Kuwait, and announced annexation.Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President said:
(OPINION)
It was my opinion then, and it is my opinion now, that our ally, Saddam Hussein, thought that (in political-ese) the US was giving Iraq a "green light" for military action. And we were, just not on the scale that Saddam Hussein was contemplating. As the Ambassador said: "I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait." Clearly implying that we did expect him to take some of Kuwait; just the oil dispute areas; the al-Rumaila Oil Field 15-20 miles from the Kuwaiti border, inside Iraq.
(COMMENT)
On 3 March 1991: Iraq accepts the terms of a ceasefire Safwan Accords, and the UN Security Council Resolution 686 2 March 1991; and then the following month, the UNSC Resolution 687. It is in UNSC Resolution 687 that the first mention on WMD restrictions are made. This sets the stage for the subsequent struggle over WMD issues in Iraq.
Most Respectfully,
R
...................................In Remembrance:
General Norman Schwarzkopf (AKA: ""The Bear.""), US Army (Ret),
Commander, United States Central Command, Desert Storm & Coalition Forces,
22 August 1934 - 28 December, 2012
Commander, United States Central Command, Desert Storm & Coalition Forces,
22 August 1934 - 28 December, 2012
No, the American policy toward Iraq was not working, in fact was a primary factor in al-Qaeda's attacks against the US including the attacks on 9-11. But where you're specific with many names, you cite "American policy" that wasn't working, this was the Clinton Administration policies that were being implemented.....Clinton and Bush I policies that weren't succeeding, in fact torching off Bin Laden's jihad.
Got a source for this grand plan? Or did you make this up?
Saddam Hussein and the American policies towards Iraq during the Clinton years were the greatest threat we'd faced in some time, but you're wrong when you state that Iraq "became" this. The Resolution passed by Congress.....while George Bush II was the Gov of Texas......cites Iraq as a grave danger to the United States and our national security. I can quote them if you'd like.
Didn't we already have this striking distance? Hadn't our operations and continued sanctions and continued no fly zone enforcements already given us such capabilities. I do agree Iran had much to do with our policy thoughts at the time, but you seem to try to make the point that Bush's invasion in 2003 gave us all these capabilities.....when we already had them.
Firstly, are we all in agreement why we were attacked on 9-11-2001? That al-Qaeda had attacked us previously in US embassies and in the USS Cole incident. That al-Qaeda had declared war on us and why, are we all rock solid there before we discuss the Iraq War?
Al Qaeda is irreverent to the topic. Iraq was a secular, nominally socialist nation populated by the 'wrong' Muslims, Al Qaeda in Iraq happened because of the war, it wasn't the cause.
Iraq was not irrelevant to al-Qaeda, you are sadly mistaken in thinking so. Al-Qaeda didn't appear in Iraq with any relevance prior to the 2003 invasion......but your statement that AQ is irrelevant to the the topic is wrong. Care to learn?
Be glad to, firstly are you of the opinion that David is correct in claiming that "Al Qaeda is irreverent to the topic" of the Iraq War?
Stonewall, et al,
We're not truly sure what cased al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden) to target the US in 1992, leading the the 1993 bombing. There were a number of factors in play. None of which involved Iraq. We are fairly confident that US force using Saudi facilities was a major sticking point with al-Qaeda.
Relative to Iraq, al-Qaeda wasn't an issue. While there were a couple of known international terrorist hiding out in Iraq, they were not al-Qaeda assets. What we called al-Qaeda in Iraq, was really the JTJ under Abu Massab al-Zaqarwi, a Jordanian terrorist. He wanted credit for his operation and was always being misidentified as AQI. So, in August of '04, he pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and AQ.
Yes, there are several Open Sources.
The bulls-eye, painted on Iraq was painted long before George Bush II and the The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), which had many of the same members as the PNAC, was instrumental in lobbying for the Legislation of the same name.
At the time, other than the naval air, there was no real regional, land base strike capability prior to Gulf War I. The Saudi bases were off-limits. The Kuwaiti base had not been established. After Gulf War I, the Kuwaiti base (Ali Al Salem Air Base) was too far south to cover tactical air all the way to the Occupied Territories, Lebanon or Syria, and still maintain any meaning time-on-target. However, there were 5 air bases west of Al Asad (along the Jordanian-Syrian Border), that were very capable of being made into US Tactical Stations. Right in the middle of every predictable Middle East targets.
Most Respectfully,
R
(COMMENT)
We're not truly sure what cased al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden) to target the US in 1992, leading the the 1993 bombing. There were a number of factors in play. None of which involved Iraq. We are fairly confident that US force using Saudi facilities was a major sticking point with al-Qaeda.
Relative to Iraq, al-Qaeda wasn't an issue. While there were a couple of known international terrorist hiding out in Iraq, they were not al-Qaeda assets. What we called al-Qaeda in Iraq, was really the JTJ under Abu Massab al-Zaqarwi, a Jordanian terrorist. He wanted credit for his operation and was always being misidentified as AQI. So, in August of '04, he pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and AQ.
Yes, there are several Open Sources.
The Project for the New American Century. said:
The Real But Unspoken Reasons For The Iraq War said:
(COMMENT)
The bulls-eye, painted on Iraq was painted long before George Bush II and the The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), which had many of the same members as the PNAC, was instrumental in lobbying for the Legislation of the same name.
(COMMENT)
At the time, other than the naval air, there was no real regional, land base strike capability prior to Gulf War I. The Saudi bases were off-limits. The Kuwaiti base had not been established. After Gulf War I, the Kuwaiti base (Ali Al Salem Air Base) was too far south to cover tactical air all the way to the Occupied Territories, Lebanon or Syria, and still maintain any meaning time-on-target. However, there were 5 air bases west of Al Asad (along the Jordanian-Syrian Border), that were very capable of being made into US Tactical Stations. Right in the middle of every predictable Middle East targets.
Most Respectfully,
R
Damn you...and your actual Data, well thought out positions....and logical thought process.
I need to learn to keep a level head like Rocco regardless of the lunacy or disrespect of the other side (not calling anyone lunatics or disrespectful here, just a general statement). Also, I need to start reading more of whatever he reads
(which might just be reading more in general)Similar threads
