The statement that these are "foundational problems" is my own characterization. These are two things that have stumped me for years now. I have tried to come up with an understanding of the world from first principles, but these two things always prevent me from doing so in a satisfactory way. I'd be interested in any thoughts on them. In particular if you want me to add more details to any particular point, just let me know - this treatment is purposely succinct for economical reasons.
1.) From the very start I must call our attention to the fact that, as a rational being, any attempt to understand my world is necessarily based on the faulty or refined use of my sense of reason. This proposition, which is of course the start of such an attempt, applies to itself, for I am implicitly assuming basic things about consistency and truth. The use of reason and the so-named attempt, therefore, are the same thing. This realization will come to undermine all of the subsequent propositions to follow.
Since I are obligated to use reason in any philosophical investigation, the question naturally arises: is reason the proper way to obtain knowledge about the world? This question cannot be answered in a logically consistent, conclusive way. To see this, I examine the two cases one at a time:
Case 1: Suppose that one claims to have provided an argument that proves reason is not the proper way to obtain knowledge. This apparent realization, however, is the result of the use of reason in the first place, and is self-defeating. In particular, the conclusion challenges the integrity of the method which was used to obtain it.
Case 2: Suppose that one claims to have provided an argument that proves reason is the proper way to obtain knowledge. Then this conclusion is meaningless because it was taken as a hypothesis to begin with.
Recalling the principle of excluded middle, I am therefore left uncertain about the validity of reason as the tool to obtain knowledge. However, as I foreshadowed above, this analysis is entirely the product and exercise of reason in the first place, and adds a further (perhaps more baffling) level of uncertainty to the subject.
2.) Philosophy is presumably the study of knowledge, knowledge which ideally will enable me to understand the nature of the world (ontology), and how to live in this world (ethics). If that is the case, then the most natural question to ask is: what is knowledge, and how does one obtain knowledge? Let me assume, for intuitive reasons, that the answer to this question is an example of knowledge. Then one is inevitably caught in a vicious circle, because this question must be answered before one can attempt to try answering it in the first place. It's similar to the difficulty one would have searching for a flashlight in a pitch black room. This is the centerpiece of the dilemma for the philosopher, in my opinion. How does one overcome this circle? The other possibility we neglected is even more confusing, namely if we assume that the answer to the question is not an example of knowledge.
1.) From the very start I must call our attention to the fact that, as a rational being, any attempt to understand my world is necessarily based on the faulty or refined use of my sense of reason. This proposition, which is of course the start of such an attempt, applies to itself, for I am implicitly assuming basic things about consistency and truth. The use of reason and the so-named attempt, therefore, are the same thing. This realization will come to undermine all of the subsequent propositions to follow.
Since I are obligated to use reason in any philosophical investigation, the question naturally arises: is reason the proper way to obtain knowledge about the world? This question cannot be answered in a logically consistent, conclusive way. To see this, I examine the two cases one at a time:
Case 1: Suppose that one claims to have provided an argument that proves reason is not the proper way to obtain knowledge. This apparent realization, however, is the result of the use of reason in the first place, and is self-defeating. In particular, the conclusion challenges the integrity of the method which was used to obtain it.
Case 2: Suppose that one claims to have provided an argument that proves reason is the proper way to obtain knowledge. Then this conclusion is meaningless because it was taken as a hypothesis to begin with.
Recalling the principle of excluded middle, I am therefore left uncertain about the validity of reason as the tool to obtain knowledge. However, as I foreshadowed above, this analysis is entirely the product and exercise of reason in the first place, and adds a further (perhaps more baffling) level of uncertainty to the subject.
2.) Philosophy is presumably the study of knowledge, knowledge which ideally will enable me to understand the nature of the world (ontology), and how to live in this world (ethics). If that is the case, then the most natural question to ask is: what is knowledge, and how does one obtain knowledge? Let me assume, for intuitive reasons, that the answer to this question is an example of knowledge. Then one is inevitably caught in a vicious circle, because this question must be answered before one can attempt to try answering it in the first place. It's similar to the difficulty one would have searching for a flashlight in a pitch black room. This is the centerpiece of the dilemma for the philosopher, in my opinion. How does one overcome this circle? The other possibility we neglected is even more confusing, namely if we assume that the answer to the question is not an example of knowledge.